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Abstract
This study examines the capacity of modernization theory,
dependency theory, world-system analysis, and political
democracy theory to explain the determinants of income
inequality in less-developedcountries before and after major
structural economic changes,stemmingfrom the collapseofthe
Bretton Woods system in 1971and the OPEC oil crisis in 1973
and 1974, occurred in the global economy. Data from two
cohorts of countries are used to test these theories. The first
cohort contains thirty-three countries with data on income
inequality between 1968 and 1973, and the second cohort
contains thirty-one countries with data on income inequality
between 1985 and 1992. The results suggest that world-system
analysis and some aspectsofdependency theory are relevant to
explaining income inequality both before and after the global
changes.. However, modernization theory and political
democracy theory are only predictive of levels of income
inequality before changes in the global economy occurred.
Overall, the results ofthis researchhighlight the importance of
integrating historical shifts in the global economy into theories
ofincome inequality.
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Boies, John Robertson, and Tim Woods for reading earlier drafts of this paper
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at the annual meetings of the Midwest Sociological Society, April 1-5, 1998,
Kansas City, MO.
Social Thought & Research
Introduction
A large number of studies have examined the determinants of
income inequality in less developed countries (LDCs). Despite
significant theoretical and methodological advances in the area, a
major shortcoming remains in the literature: the effects of
changing historical conditions, in particular recent changes in the
global economy, on determinants of income inequality in LDCs
have not been examined. Recognizing this omission is important
if we are to avoid ahistorical explanations of social phenomena.
Changing Historical Conditions
Since the 1970s the structure of the global economy has
experienced dramatic changes as a consequence, in part, of two
events: (1) the collapseof the Bretton Woods monetary system in
1971,making the value of the dollar vulnerable to fluctuations in
the world monetary market (Block 1977) and (2) the 1973-1974
OPEC oil crisis, causingthe price of Middle East oil to rise from
its 1970 price of $1.50 per barrel to $9.50 per barrel in 1973, a
533% increase (Barnet and Muller, 1974: 198). These two events
were a manifestation of alarger change in social structures, which
signaled a major change in the way that developed countries
treated developing countries (Cox 1997: 53). Whereas
development assistanthadbeen a major international focus in the
post-World War II years, the structural changes that took place in
the 1970s resulted in a new focus on the debt of developing
countries (Cox 1997: 55). According to Cox: "public funds would
no~ flow to developing countries; their capital needs would have
to be met by offering conditions to attract multinational
corporations (MNCs) or by borrowing from foreign banks"
(1997: 55).
Three trends in LDCs have accompanied these changes in the
global economy. First, the structure of trade and foreign
investment in LDCs has experienced a decrease in the export of
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raw materials and an increase in the export of manufactured
products (Berberoglu, 1987: 34-35). For example, the share of
U.S. manufacturing investments rose from 17% of its total
investment in LDCs in 1960 to 29% in 1994, while the share of
u.s. raw-material investments dropped from 61% in 1960to 23%
in 1980 (Berberoglu, 1987: 35; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996).
Further, between 1972 and 1983 the United States increased its
manufactured imports from LDCs from 11010 to 28% of its total
imports (Kolka, 1988: 215).
The second trend is an increase in foreign investment in the
financial sector of LDCs, increasing from 8% of the u.s. total
investment in LDCs in 1970 to 35% in 1994 (Berberoglu, 1987:
35;U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996).The third trend involves the
expansion of intrafirm trading through subsidiaries of
multinational corporations (Kolka 1988). For example, it is
estimated that in the 1980s about half of all foreign trade took
place through transnational corporations and their subsidiaries
(Bomschier and Chase-Dunn 1985). More recently, it is
estimated that in 1992 the top 100 non-banking multinational
corporations accounted for about $3.4 trillion in global assets
(Thompson 1997: 149) and controlled sales nearly equal to the
size of the u.s. economy (McGrew 1997: 6).
Major historical shifts in the global economy may yield changes
in the determinants of the distribution of income in LDCs.
However, no theoretical or empirical research has specifically
addressed this issue. This study will attempt to fill that gap by
examining the capacity of modernization theory, dependency
theory, world-system analysis, and political democracy theory to
explain income inequality in LDes before and after the historical
shifts in the global economy.
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Theories and Hypotheses
Modernization Theory
Numerous scholars have used modernization theory to examine
income inequality (Kuznets "1957, 1963; Cutright 1967; Paukert
1973; Chenery and Syrquin 1975; Ahluwalia 1976; Weede and
Kummer 1985; Nielsen 1994). Modernization theorists contend
that all countries proceed through unilinear stages of economic
development and that in order for LDCs to industrialize they
must increase productivity, develop a modern manufacturing
sector, and modernize their social and political institutions
(Rostow, 1971: 1, 39). These theorists further allege that the
diffusion of modern valuesfrom core countries to LDCs initiates
the development of modern political and social institutions and
modern attitudes necessary for industrialization. Modern values
include an openness to new experience, readiness for social
change, orientation toward the future, efficacy, long-term
planning, valuing technical skill, and educational and
occupational aspirations (Inkeles and Smith, 1974: 19-25).
According to this theory, economic development is curvilinearly
related to income inequality, with low levels of income
inequality at low and high levels of development, and high levels
of income inequality at intermediate levels of economic
development. With industrialization, the need for a highly
skilled labor force to perform technologically complex jobs
increases, and the need for low-skilled positions declines, while
educational opportunities concomitantly expand to meet the
needs of a skilled labor force (Stack, 1978: 881; Stack and
Zimmerman, 1982: 348;Prechel, 1985:214; Simpson, 1990:682).
Further, because capitalists are forced to compete for labor,
wages throughout labor markets increase (Firebaugh and Beck,
1994: 634). Inequality initially increases because only a small
portion of the workers finds employment in the industrialized
sector of the economy. However, as industrialization expands,
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more jobs are created, resulting in an expansion of the middle
class and a subsequent decline in the level of income inequality.
H1: The level of income inequality is a curvilinear
(inverted-u shaped) function of level of
economic development in LDCs.
Dependency Theory
In contrast, dependency theory is rooted in the idea ~hat
asymmetrical economic dependence of LDCs on core nations
produces the "development of underdevelopment" in LDCs
(Frank 1969; Galtung 1971; Chase-Dunn 1975; Kaufma~ et al.
1975; Rubinson 1976; Bornschier, et al. 1978; Bornschler and
Ballmer-Cao 1979; Evans and Timberlake 1980; Bornschier and
Chase-Dunn 1985; Preche11985; London and Robinson 1989).
Economic dependence of LDCs ranges from investment by
transnational corporations that own and control the means of
production within the LDC to les~ direct ~orms o~ depen~ence
such as foreign aid programs, credit agenCIes, and international
trade (Chase-Dunn, 1975: 721).Dependency theorists ~ssert t~at
the more dependent a country is on other countnes for I:S
livelihood the less dominance and influence that country WIll
have relative to other countries. Levels of income inequality,
according to this perspective, are positively related to the level of
dependence because of the structural consequences of LDCs'
having less power to advance their interests relative to.other
countries. Such structural consequences include export-orIented
economies, weak governments, and domestic elites that align
with elites in advanced capitalist societies (Rubinson, 1976: 638;
Braun, 1991: 31-32; Nielsen, 1994: 672).
Dependency theorists focus on three types of dependence, the
first of which is foreign investment dependence. Depend~ncy
theorists assert that investment by transnational corporauons
increases income inequality due to the creation of a "bridgehead"
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(Galtung, 1971: 83) between the core and LDC elites (Galtung
1971; Firebaugh and Beck 1994). Transnational corporations
influence the expenditures of the host state through direct and
indirect political pressures to favor their interests, for example,
calling for an expansion of the host country's infrastructure
(Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao, 1979: 499). This diverts resources
that could be used to redistribute income to poorer members of
society. Sunkel (1973) asserts that the connection of the
transnational corporations with the elites of the LDC creates a
political structure that keeps wages low and concentrates
development on the world market. Further, transnational
corporations frequently oppose any redistributive programs
because they fear such policies will lead to a "threat to the
stability of the dominant sociopolitical coalition which they
support and by which they are also supported " (Bornschier and
Ballmer-Cao, 1979: 499).
In addition,investments by transnational corporations increase
income inequality becauseprofits are reinvested in the profitable,
high-wage sector, restricting economic growth in the less-
profitable sectors of the economy (Bodenheimer, 1971: 350).
This fractionalizes labor by paying higher wagesthan the "going
rate" in the high-profit, high-wage sector, creating labor
aristocracies. The subequal duallabor market creates a structural
variable to disunify labor and a concerted labor movement,
decreasing labor's bargaining power (Bornschier and Ballmer-
Cao, 1979: 495; Rubinson, 1976: 644).
Second, dependency theorists focus on debt dependence.
Dependency theorists view loans from international lending
agencies as harmful to LDCs because they accrue foreign debt.
The foreign assistance is invested in the most profitable sectors of
the economy, and whatever profits that are made through the
utilization of this assistance must be used to repay the lending
agency (Bodenheimer, 1971: 351). Further, loans received by
IMP and the WorId Bank at certain points in time required some
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countries to devalue their currency and make other structural
adjustments, which often caused hardships for the masses of
citizens.
Third, dependency theorists focus on trade dependence. These
theorists assertthat the foreign trade relationship between LDCs
and core countries creates a high-profit, high-wage sector and a
low-profit, low-wage traditional sector in the economy ~f t~e
LDCs (Barratt Brown, 1974: 276; Nielsen, 1.9~4: 658). Capital is
concentrated in the modern sector because It IS able to produce
more and maintain higher profits than the traditional sector.
This reduces the amount of capital available to invest in the
traditional sectors thus exacerbating the inequalities between the
two sectors. The' wage disparity between the traditional ~d
modern sectors encourages workers to migrate to urban areasIn
order to attain employment in the modern sector (Barratt
Brown, 1974: 253). However, with only a limited number of
urban jobs available, many of the migrantswill b~ un~mployed at
the same time that the rural areas are experIenCIng a labor
shortage (Evans and Timberlake, 1980: 534; Prechel, 1985: 21~).
Thus, inequality increases because few workers are employed In
the very profitable modern sector, while most workers are
employed in the traditional sector or are unemployed (Prechel,
1985: 216; Evans and Stephens, 1988: 755; London and
Robinson, 1989: 305).
Dependency theorists further contend that the nature of foreign
trade harms developing countries due to the unequal exchange
between developed and developing countries (Emmanuel 1972).
Barratt Brown (1976: 229) sums up this idea quite nicely:
With abundant resources or mechanical aids a rich country
can obtain more direct labour and provide less in the goods
exchanged than a poor country, so that v:ealt~ an~ poverty
become cumulatively polarized; and this widening gap IS
compounded by steadily deterioratin? terms of t~ade for
the poor countries, i.e, the prices of their products rise more
slowly or fall faster than those of the rich countries'
products. 189
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In addition, some theorists contend that the structure of the
world economy leads to undifferentiated economies in LDCs,
diminishing their chances at industrialization (Prebisch 1950).
H2: Foreign investment is positively related to income
inequality in LDCs.
H3: Foreign debt is positively related to Income
inequality in LDCs.
H4: Foreign trade is positively related to Income
inequality in LDCs.
World-System Analysis
World-system analysis constitutes a third model of income
inequality (Wallerstein 1974, 1979, 1980; Nolan 1983a, 1983b;
Braun 1991). This perspective is an extension of dependency
theory and, as such, is similar to dependency theory in many
respects (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985: 1-5).World-system
analysis, like dependency theory, alleges that a country's
stratification system is largely determined by its position in the
world division of labor and power structure (Bornschier and
Chase-Dunn, 1985: 1). However, a distinction between world-
system analysis and dependency theory is that whereas
dependency theorists group all LDCs into one category, world-
system analysts distinguishes between two types of LDCs,
peripheral and semiperipheral countries (Wallerstein 1974).
Chirot (1977: 13) defines peripheral countries as "economically
overspecialized, relatively poor and weak societies that are
subject to manipulation or direct control by the core powers"
(emphasis in original). Semi-peripheral countries are defined as
"societies midway between the core and periphery that are trying
to industrialize and diversify their economies" (Chirot, 1977: 13).
World-system analysts contend that semi-peripheral countries
have lower levels of income inequality than peripheral countries
because they are less dependent upon core countries and are not
affected by the structural consequences of having the lowest
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position in the world stratification system (Chirot, 1977: 13).
Further, semiperipheral countries are generally in the process of
industrializing and diversifying their economies, thus making
them less open to manipulation by core countries (Chirot, 1977:
13).
H5: Semiperipheral countries have lower levels of
income inequality than peripheral countries.
Political Democracy Theory
Political democracy theory, based on Lenski's (1966)
stratification theory, focuses on the effect of democratization on
income inequality (Cutright 1967;Jackman 1974; Rubinson and
Quinlan 1977; Stack 1979; Bollen and Grandjean 1981; Weede
1982; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Muller 1988; Simpson 1990;
Crenshaw 1992). This theory asserts that in order for income
inequality to decline, political participation must be extended to
the masses. With political democracy "...the many can combine
against the few, and, even though individually the many are
weaker, in combination they may be as strong or stronger"
(Lenski, 1966: 318). As political rights expand, middle-class and
lower-class persons are brought into the electorate. With political
democracy the government, no longer controlled by an elite
group, is accessible to many organized interests and represents
the interests of most people in society (Lenski: 318). Political
democracy theory argues that representation in the state of the
previously excluded and less-advantaged working and lower
classes should result in a more equitable income distribution.
H6: Political democracy is negatively related to income
inequality in LDCs.
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Conflicting Results of Previous Studies
Some studies confirm that a curvilinear relationship exists
between economic development and income inequality,
consistent with modernization theory (Kuznets 1957, 1963;
Paukert 1973; Ahluwalia 1976; Weede and Tiefenbach 1981;
Stack and Zimmerman 1982). However, other studies have
found that when level of dependence is controlled this
relationship disappears (Prechel198S; Chan 1989).
Various forms of dependence have been shown to affect income
inequality. Kaufman, et al. (1975) and Chan (1989) found that
investment dependence increases inequality, and Chase-Dunn
(1975) and Rubinson (1976) found that investment dependence
and aid dependence increase income inequality. Bornschier and
Ballmer-Cao (1979) found that MNC-penetration increases levels
of income inequality through its effects on the power
distribution of a country. Galtung (1971) and Prechel (1985)
found that trade dependence is positively related to income
inequality. However, Chan (1989) found that trade dependence
has little influence on income inequality, and Weede and
Tiefenbach (1981) found little support for the contention that
trade dependence and foreign investment dependence exacerbate
income inequality.
Research from world-system analysis yields mixed results. Some
scholars have found world-system position to be significantly
related to level of income inequality (Nolan 1983a, 1983b; Braun
1991), while other have found no significant relationship
between the two variables (Weede and Tiefenbach 1981; Bollen
andJackman 1985).Still others claim that world-system status is
nothing more than a measure of economic development (see
Weede and Kummer 1985 for an elaboration of this argument).
The findings from political democracy theory are also disparate.
Some studies have found a negative relationship between level of
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political democracy and level of income inequality (Rubinson
and Quinlan 1977; Stack 1979; Weede 1980; Muller 1988;
Simpson 1990). Other studies have found this relationship to be
curvilinear, with countries at intermediate levels of democracy
experiencing the highest levels of income inequality (Simpson
1990; Crenshaw 1992). Still others have found no relationship
between democracy and income inequality aackman 1974;
Hewitt 1977; Bollen and Grandjean 1981; Bollen and Jackman
1985).
This study is an attempt to examine the capacity of these theories
to explain inequality in a changing global economy. The paper
tests dimensions of modernization theory, dependency theory,
world-system analysis, and political democracy theory to
determine their capacity to explain income inequality in LDCs
during two time periods, one before the changes in the global
economy and one after. Two time periods are used to analyze
whether the effects of the independent variables on income
inequality varied before and after rapid changes in the global
economy.
Methods
Sample
To address the effects of temporal changes in the global
economy, I examine two time periods in this study: one period
prior to the rapid changes in the global economy, 1968-1973, and
one period subsequent to the changes, 1985-1992 (seepp. 30-32).
The first time period was selected to examine the relationship
between income inequality and the independent effects of the
variables advanced by the competing theories before the changes
in the global economy. The second time period was selected to
allow the longest time period possible following changes in the
global economy, allowing sufficient time for the independent
variables to affect the dependent variable.
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The original sample consisted of forty-seven countries in the first
time period and thirty-six countries in the second time period.1
Socialist and Eastern-bloc countries were not included in the
sample as they are not fully integrated members of the global
capitalist economy. Because of missing data on one or more of
the independent variables, fourteen countries were eliminated
from the first cohort, and five countries were eliminated from the
second cohort.2 The final sample consists of thirty-three
countries in the first· cohort and thirty-one countries in the
second cohort.':'
Measurement
The Global Economy and Changes
Six independent variables are included in the study: level of
economic development, investment dependence, debt depen-
dence, trade dependence, world-system position and level of
political democracy. Level of economic development (LOGDP
and LOGDPSQ) is operationalized as the natural log of gross
domestic product per capita.' The natural log of gross domestic
product per capita is used by Paukert (1973); Roberti (1974);
Prechel (1985); and Nielsen (1994). These data are taken from
World Bank's World Tables ofEconomic and Social Indicators. A
quadratic expression is used to representthis variable, as income
inequality is purported to be a curvilinear function of level of
economic development.
World-System Frequency Percentage Frequency PercentagePosition
Semiperipheral 9 27.3°k 9 29%Peripheral 24 72.70/0 22 71%
194
The second independent variable, investment dependence
(FORINV), refersto the amount of foreign investment flow~ng
into a country.! It is operationalized as the value of forelg~
investment flowing into the country as a percent of GDP. ThIS
measure is taken from the World Bank's World Tables of
Economic and Social Indicators.
Debt dependence (DEBT) is operationalized as the amount of
long-term loan repayment by a country as a percent of GDP.
This measure has not been used in previous studies but should
capture dependency effects as only those countries that are
currently repaying their debt should experience the effects of
debt dependence. Most studies operationalize debt d~pendence
with a measure of total external debt. However, this measure
may not capture the theoretical construct of debt dep.endence.
Debt injects resources into the economy, perhaps lowe~mgleve~s
of income inequality through its effect on job creation. ThIS
advantageous side-effect may not be sustained in the long-tern:,
especially if countries are using their resources ~o repay their
debt. Thus, I believe debt repayment to be a superIormeasureof
debt dependence. These data are taken from the World Bank's
World Tables ofEconomic and Social Indicators.
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.450
5.511
30.854
2.335
-.591
-.001
3.636
The dependent variable, income inequality, is operationalized as
the Gini coefficient. This measure is used in many income
inequality studies (Galtung 1971; Paukert 1973; Chase-Dunn
1975; Kaufman, et al. 1975; Rubinson 1976; Bornschier and
Ballmer-Cao 1979; Weede and Tiefenbach 1981; Prechel 1985;
Weede and Kummer 1985; Nielsen 1994), making the results
from this study comparable to the results from previous studies.
The data were compiled from several sources.V See Table 1 for
descriptive statistics on variables included in the study.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis
Cohort 1 Cohort 2
Variable Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation
.083 .418 .087
.704 6.737 .739
7.754 45.914 9.890
3.371 3.450 1.947
.270 -.405 .226
.066 .006 .007
2.089 4.129 1.746
GINI
LOGDP
LOGDPSQ
DEBT
GALTUNG
FORINV
DEM
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The fourth independent variable, trade dependence (GALTUNG),
refers to "the unequal exchange contained in the terms of trade"
(Barratt Brown, 1976: 229) and is operationalized with the
Galtung trade index? (Galtung 1971). This index ranges from a
low of -1 to a high of +1. Countries scoring a -1 on this index have
high levels of raw-material exports and high levels of processed-
goods imports. Countries scoring a + 1 on this index have hi?h
levels of processed-good exports and high levels of raw-material
imports. These data are taken from the United Nations'
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. Galtung (1971) and
Alschuler (1976) use this operationalization.'?
The fifth independent variable is world-system position
(WSPOS). This variable is operationalized using Snyder and
Kick's (1979) classification, with modifications from Bollen
(1983). Snyder and Kick (1979) "block model" four types. of
international networks: trade flows, treaty memberships,
military interventions, and diplomatic relations. The block
model results in ten blocks of countries, which can be collapsed
into core, semiperipheral, and peripheral countries. Bollen (1983)
modifies Snyder and Kick's (1979) classification by reclassifying
six countries. This classification system is used by Bollen (1983);
Nolan (1983a, 1983b); Weede and Kummer (1985); and Braun
(1991). I coded five countries not classified by Bollen (1983). or
Snyder and Kick (1979) based on my knowledge of the countries:
Bangladesh, Barbados, Fiji, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In
the regression analysis, semiperipheral countries are coded one,
and peripheral countries are coded zero.
The final independent variable, political democracy (DEM), is
operationalized with Gastil's (1989) measure of political ri?~ts,
defined as "rights to participate meaningfully in the political
process" (p. 7).11 This variable is measured on an ordinal scale
with 7 being the least democratic society and 1 being t~e ~ost
democratic society. To simplify interpretation of the findings,
the scale was transformed so that 7 is the most democratic
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society, and 1 is the least democratic society. This scale is
constructed comparatively, thus indicating how free a country is
relative to other countries.F COHORT is used as a control
variable to allow for the analysis of time in the model. Countries
in the first cohort are coded zero, and countries in the second
cohort are coded one.
Research Design
This study uses a pooled-cohort research design. The first cohort
consists of countries with data on income inequality between
1968 and 1973, and the second cohort consists of countries with
data on income inequality between 1985 and 1992.This research
design is appropriate given the goalof the study, which is to study
the determinants of income inequality before and after major
change in the global economy occurred." Using a cohort design
allows for the analysis of the effect of time, enabling one to assess
the conditioning effect of the changing structural dimensions of
the world economy on determinants of income inequality.
A pooled-cohort research design is used due to the small sample
size of each of the individual cohorts. Pooling the data increases
the number of 'degrees of freedom and gives more sound
estimates than the individual cohort analyses. The difference in
dynamic effects of the causal variables on income inequality will
be tested by examining interaction terms between cohort and
each of these variables. These estimates will indicate whether the
effect differed in the two cohorts. Ordinary least squares (OLS)
multiple regression is used to analyze the data.
T a reduce possible bias that may result from using a measure of
the independent variables from one year, the mean is taken from
among the fourth, fifth, and sixth years before the measurement
of the dependent variable. The measures of the independent
variables are lagged to allow time for them to affect the level of
income inequality."
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Findings Table 2. Unstandardized OLS Estimates for Regression of Income Inequality on
Independent Variables for the Pooled Sample
DEBT -.001 -.002
(.420) (.305)
LOGGDP .060 .313*
(.294) (.044)
LOGGDPSQ -.002 -.026
.(.418) (.059)
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8Correlation matrices for cohort 1, cohort 2, and the cohorts
simultaneously gives no indication of multicollinearity (not
shown)." An examination of the residuals (not shown) indicates
no significant heteroskedasticity. OLS multiple regression is used
to examine the multivariate relationships for the pooled data,
controlling for cohort. The results are presented in Table 2.16
Variable Model 1 Model 2
.365* .040 .060 .069
(.037) (.362) (.298) (.266)
-.031* .000 -.002 -.003
(.049) (0495) (.419) (.381)
-.002 .002 -.001 -.001
(.296) (.347) (.427) (.382)
.034 .098
(.381) (.192)
.000 -.005
(0489) (.294)
-.001 -.001
(.3~6) (.377)
CO·WSPOS -
CO*DEM
*p~ .05 (one-tailedtest)
*ltp ~ .01 (one-tailedtest)
Note:Numbers in parenthesesare p values.
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.017*
(.051)
.007
(.432)
.247 .096
(.236) (.387)
.208 .265
64 64
-.029
(.371)
-.010
(.112)
-.051 -.073* -.058 -.081* -.081* -.055
(.125) (.047) (.183) (.033) (.054) (.105)
-.288 -.355 -.324 -All* -.392* -.308
(.098) (.056) (.100) (.035) (.049) (.084)
-.027 -.039* -.039* -.036* -.041 -.038*
(.116) (.036) (.041) (.050) (.089) (.040)
-.005 -.004 -.004 -.004 -.004 -.011*
(.154) (.240) (.225) (.211) (.236) (.054)
-.350** -.053 -.095* -.093** -.084** -.151**
(.012) C065) (.033) (.001) (.004) (.002)
.007* -
(.038)
FORINV -.361* -.289
(.054) (.098)
WSPOS -.039* -.028
(.038) (.109)
GALTUNG -.073* -.050
(.049) (.134)
DEM -.004 -.005
(.239) (.156)
COHORT -.081** -.592*
(.002) (.024)
CO*LGDP - .083*
(.042)
CO*LGDPS -
CO*DEBT -
CO*GALT -
CO*FORIN - 2.623
(.078)
Intercept .172 -.462 -.603 .219 .186 .145
(.306) (.174) (.135) (.259) (.295) (.333)
Adj. R2 .242 .269 .272 .249 .229 .256
n 64 64 64 64 64 64
I
.1
~'1
Model 1 in Table 2 examines the pooled-data with no interaction
terms. This model indicates that the best predictors of income
inequality for the pooled data are GALTUNG, FORINV, and
WSPos. The negative coefficient of GALTUNG supports the
dependency theory hypothesis that those countries with a more
advantageous structure of foreign trade have lower levels of
inequality than those countries with less advantageous structures
of trade (Hypothesis 4). The negative coefficient of WSPOS
indicates that semi-peripheral countries have lower levels of
income inequality than peripheral countries, supporting world-
system analysis (Hypothesis 5). The negative effect of FORINV
on inequality does not support dependency theory's hypothesis
of the exacerbating effects of foreign investment on income
inequality (Hypothesis 2). However, as discussed earlier, the
measure of foreign investment used is a flow measure of
investment, which may not truly detect the effects of
dependence.
The other dependency measure, DEBT, is not statistically
significant. Thus, hypothesis 3, that debt dependence leads to
high levels of income inequality in LDCs, is not supported.
Modernization theory is not supported in the pooled-analysis as
neither LOGDP nor LOGDPSQ are statistically significant
(Hypotheses 1 and 2). Further, political democracy theory is not
supported in this analysis (Hypothesis 6). The statistical
significance of COHORT indicates that the globalization cohort
of countries has a significantly lower mean level of inequality
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than does the pre-globalization cohort. The adjusted R2 for this
model is .242.
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Table 3. Unstandardized OLS Estimates for Regression of Income
Inequality on Independent Variables for Cohort 1 and Cohort 2
To ascertain whether the effects of the independent variables
varied between cohorts, I included interaction terms between
cohort and each of these variables. They are included in separate
models (models 2-8), to reduce problems of multicollinearity.
The statistical significance of three of the interaction terms
suggests that the effects of LOGDP, LOGDPSQ, and DEM vary
between cohorts. These interaction terms indicate that the slopes
of these variables changed significantly between the two cohorts.
However, they do not tell us whether the statistical significance
of the variables changed between the two cohorts. To examine
this, I analyzed each of the cohorts independently (Table 3).
Before moving on, note that the coefficients from model! appear
to be fairly robust across models. There are only slight changes in
statistical significant of the variables, likely due to problems of
multicollinearity.
Table 3 gives the results of the cohorts analyzed separately."
Splitting the analysis augments the pooled analysis by letting one
examine the statistical significance of the variables in each of the
cohorts. This will indicate whether the capacity of each theory to
explain income inequality changed with the structural change in
the global economy.
It becomes clear from an examination of these two models why
the interactions between cohort and LOGDP, LOGDPSQ, and
DEM are statistically significant in the pooled analysis. These
variables are each significant in the first cohort of pre-
globalization countries, but not in the second cohort of countries
after globalization. This suggests that modernization theory and
political democracy theory are supported in the first cohort but
not the second. The adjusted R2 for the model analyzing the first
cohort is .184. The only variable that is statistically significant in
the second cohort is DEBT. However, this effect is not in the
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Variable Cohort 1 Cohort 2
LOGDP .445::·
.339
(.056) (.144)
LOGDPSQ
-.038*
-.021
(.069) (.181)
DEBT
.001
-.013::-
(.446) (.062)
GALTUNG
-.030
-.062
(.314) (.196)
FORINV
-.239 2.046
(.163) (.147)
WSPOS
-.013
-.031
(.343) (.170)
DEM
-.012::·::-
.002
(.041) (.431)
Intercept
-.801
-.886
(.143) (.399)
-,-I Adjusted R2 .184 .222
I n 33 31
*p .s .10 (one-tailed test)
*:'t'p~ .05 (one-tailed test)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are p values.
predicted direction. The adjusted R2 for the model analyzing the
second cohort is .222. Note that GALTUNG and WSPOS are
not significant in either cohort. This is likely due to the small
number of countries included in each of the cohorts. However,
because their effects do not change across cohorts, when the data
are pooled, the true effect of these variables appears.
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Discussion and Conclusions
The most important finding in this study is that determinants of
income inequality change with transformations in the global
economy. Democracy had a statistically significant negative
effect on income inequality in the first cohort, but a non-
significant effect in the second cohort. This suggests that changes
in the global economy may have negated the leveling effects of
democracy and that LDCs that focus on increasing levels of
democracy will not necessarily experience a more equitable shift
in their income distributions.
A possible explanation for these results rests with the
simultaneous shift of the international political economy with
the end of the Cold War, and the rapid expansion of
transnational corporations since that time. During the Cold War,
governments outside the core sectors of the global economy had
more control over their economies. However, since the end of
the Cold War, the power of these governments has been
undermined as transnational corporations have become
increasingly mobile, integrating national economies into a global
economy (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994, pp. 14-19). As Barnet and
Cavanagh (1994, p. 19) state, "[b]usiness enterprises that
routinely operate across borders are linking far-flung pieces of
territory into a new world economy that bypasses all sorts of
established political arrangements and conventions."
One consequence of the increased mobility of capital is the
ability of corporations to exploit differences among national tax
systems to their advantage (Martin and Schumann 1996: 198).
The simplest method of exploiting tax systems is through
transfer pricing, which is "based on a cross-border combination
of subsidiaries and branches" (Martin and Schumann 1996:198).
Martin and Schumann (1996: 198-199) describe this practice:
Since they trade with one another in unfinished products,·
services or even just licenses, the firms are able to charge
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costs to one another in almost any way they please. The
expenditure of internationally active companies is therefore
always highest where tax rates are also highest. ConverselyJ
subsidiaries operating in tax havens or low-tax regions
always make exorbitant profits, even if all they have there
are an office with a fax connection and a staff of two.
At least two consequences result from the exploitation of
national tax systems. First, countries are made to compete with
each other for corporate capital investments (Martin and
Schumann 1996). They do this by offering corporations financial
inducements in the form of taxes and favorable economic
incentives. Second, the practice of offering inducements puts
tremendous financial stress on the governments of these
countries in the face of ever-increasing expenses. Accordingly,
"the politicians in charge often have no choice but to cut
spending in areas where no powerful interest groups prevent it:
that is, in social security, cultural facilities and public services,
from swimming-baths to schools and universities. The state thus
becomes an agency of bottom to top redistribution" (Martin and
Schumann 1996: 206; emphasis added).
This brief account of the pressures on the state in this global era
is meant to demonstrate the very real possibility that LDC
governments are increasingly unable to implement policies and
make decisions that result in a more equal distribution of income.
Even if these governments are democratic, structural pressures
stemming from global competition over capital results in
reduction or possible elimination of social policies that benefit
the lower-part of the income distribution.
Similarly, the effect of level of economic development on income
inequality also disappears after globalization. Level of economic
development had a curvilinear effect on inequality in the first
cohort but not the second. Thus, changes in the global economy
may have changed the effects of development. The level of
economic development in developing countries may no longer
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be a reliable indicator of how equitable incomes are distributed.
Further, we should not expect inequality in developing countries
to necessarily diminish as they industrialize.
These findings suggestthat theories developed during a previous
historical period may not adequately explain income inequality
in the modern historical period of globalization. It is important
to take this into account as one strives to understand the
stratification systems of less-developed countries. The global era
may present inherently different challenges to countries,
ultimately altering the effects of different social structures on
inequality. Thus, a fruitful direction for research in this area is to
develop new theories more appropriate to the modern era.
Other findings from this study are also important. Support for
dependency theory exists in the pooled analysis. GALTUNG, a
measure of trade dependence, has a statistically significant
negative effect on income inequality, aspredicted by dependency
theory. This means that countries that export mostly raw
materials and import mostly manufactured products tend to have
high levels of income inequality, while countries that import
mostly raw materials and export mostly manufactured products
tend to have low levels of income inequality. This effect appears
to hold across cohorts, suggesting that the effect of trade
dependence has not changed with globalization. Investment
dependence and debt dependence appear to have slight effects on
income inequality, although the directions of the effect are
reversed from that expected. The direction of the effect of
investment dependence is likely due to my operationalizing this
variable with a flow measure, as discussed previously. The
reversed effect of debt dependence in the second cohort is
somewhat troubling. It may indicate that those countries that are
able to repay their debts have more revenues with which to
reduce inequality.
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World-system position also has a statistically significant effect on
level of income inequality in the pooled analysis. This finding
indicates that semiperipheral countries have a lower mean level
of income inequality than peripheral countries, supporting
world-system analysis. This is important because world-system
position is found to affect inequality while controlling for three
measures of dependence. As noted earlier in the paper,
dependency theory and world-system analysis are similar in
many respects, with one difference being that world-system
analysis distinguishes between semiperipheral and peripheral
countries, whereas dependency theory groups allLDCs together.
This suggests that it is not appropriate to view allLDCs assimilar
because semiperipheral countries tend to have a more equitable
income distribution than peripheral countries.
The finding that trade dependence and world-system position
affect income inequality highlights the importance of examining
core-semiperipheral-peripheral relations. These findings suggest
that a country's chances of maintaining an equitable distribution
of income are affected not only by its own characteristics, but
also by its relationships to other countries. Thus, examining
these relationships becomes important if one wants to
understand the stratification system of a country.
Overall, the results of this research highlight the effects of
historical shifts in the global economy and point toward the need
to further integrate the shifts into theories of income inequality.
Ahistorical theories may not help to advance our understanding
of the determinants of income inequality in LDCs in a changing
world economy. A move toward incorporating past and present
histories of the political and economic environments
surrounding these countries is necessary to reach a higher level of
understanding.
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Notes
'Countries were selected on the basis of availability of data on income
inequality during these two time periods.
2Countries with missing data in the first cohort are Bahamas, Bangladesh,
Botswana, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Malysia, New Zealand,
Peru, Taiwan, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Countries with missing data in the
second cohort are Botswana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Tanzania, and Uganda.
3Countries included in the first cohort are Argentina, Barbados, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana,
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leon~, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zambia, Countries
included in the second cohort are Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritania,
Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Phillippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Tunisia, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
"Although this sample size is relatively small, the sample size is taken into
account by the shape of the t-distribution when hypothesis tests are conducted
(Kmenta 1997: 142-143).
sSources include Ahluwalia (1976); Jain (1975); Lecaillon (1984); Paukert
(1973); Roberti (1974); Simpson (1990); World Bank (1979, 1994).
6The majority of these data are taken from World Bank, arguably the most
reliable source of cross-national data.
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7Gross domestic product per capita was logged to normalize its positively
skewed distribution. This transformation is commonly performed in this
literature.
8Bornschier, et al. (1978) note that studies that use flow measures of foreign
investment often find positive effects of foreign investment on economic
growth, while studies that use stock measures of foreign investment tend to find
negative effects of foreign investment on economic growth. (Flow measures
refer to the amount of foreign investment coming into a country within a given
time period, while stock measures refer to the accumulated amount of foreign
investment within a country). There is reason to believe that these measures
may also affect income inequality differently, with flow measures decreasing
inequality because of the initial flow of resources into the country and stock
measures increasing inequality because of the creation of a dual labor market
and an alliance between core and peripheral elites. However, due to the
unavailability of data on stock measures of foreign investment for the given
time periods, a flow measure was used.
"The Galtung trade index is defined as: (a+d)-(Q +c)
(a+d)+(b+ c)
where (a)is the value of raw materials imported; (b) is the value of raw materials
exported; (c) is the value of processed goods imported, and (d) is the value of
processed goods exported.
10According to dependency theory, the Galtung index should be negatively
related to income inequality. Countries scoring + 1 have a low level of trade
dependence, while countries scoring a -1 have a high level of trade dependence.
Thus, consistent with dependency theory, countries with high scores on the
Galtung index should have low levels of income inequality.
"Bollen's data on political democracy was not used in this study because he
provides data on democracy only for the years 1965 and 1980, whereas Gastil
provides yearly data on this variable. The use of Gastil's measure allows one to
lag the data on political democracy according to the year of income inequality
data available for each country.
12The scale of political rights measures the extent to which eleven ideals of
democracy are met: (1) the chief authority was recently elected by a meaningful
process; (2) the legislature was recently elected by a meaningful process; (3) fair
election laws, campaigning opportunity, polling and tabulation exist; (4) there
is fair reflection of voter preference in the distribution of power; (5) there are
multiple political parties; (6) there have been recent shifts in power through
elections; (7) there is significant opposition vote; (8) the country is free of
military or foreign control; (9) no major group or groups are denied reasonable
self-determination; (10) there is decentralized political power; and (11) there is
informal consensus (Gastil, 1989:9).
13Although time-series analysis or panel analysis would be preferable to
cohort analysis, data availability on the dependent variable would not allow for
these more sophisticated data analyses. Time-series analysis is not feasible due
to the lack of continuous time-series data on income inequality for LDCs. Panel
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analysis is not possible due to the lack of income inequality data on the same
countries in both of the time periods analyzed.
14Due to problems of data availability, it was neither possible to lag all
measurements nor to collect data for three years, among which the mean would
be taken on all of the independent variable measurements. The exceptions to the
research design are as follows. Debt data for the first cohort of countries are
from 1971. In the first cohort of countries, foreign investment data from the
year 1967 were used for the following countries: Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, £1 Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India,
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sierre
Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, and Venezuela. Foreign investment data from the years
1967 and 1968 were used for Brazil. Foreign investment data from the year 1970
were used for India. Political democracy data for the year 1972 were used for all
countries in the first cohort. In the second cohort, Ghana t s trade data are from
the years 1980, 1981, and 1982.
15The variables involved in the polynomial equation (LOGDP and
LOGDPSQ) by their very nature are, however, highly collinear.
16Although the sample in this study is not random, significance levels are
reported because they are good indicators as to whether the estimated effects are
large enough to be considered empirically important.
171n the split analysis I accepted coefficients as statistically significant at the
.10 level, given that small samples cause conservative significance tests (Winkler
and Hays 1975).
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Abstract
A cross nationaldatasetconsisting of122 nationalchiefexecu-
tives who werein office in 1990isusedto testthevalidity ofa
modelofAmerican elitegenerational continuity. Thehypoth-
esis is that the modelwill beasusefulin explainingthekinship
dimensions ofelitecontinuity in otherpoliticalsystems as it is
in thestudy ofAmerican political leadership. In broadterms
thefindings with respect to nationalchiefexecutives correspond
closely to the expectations ofthe model.Mostofthe differences
between theexpected and the discovered kinshippatterns may
beaccountedfor bythefact that descendants ofat leastsomeof
the leaders still have time to enter thepoliticalarena.
As the United States approaches the formal beginning of the presi-
dential election of 2000, the four leading contenders represent a
continuing characteristic of American politics; they are all the
product of politically active or public families. Governor George
W. Bush is the son of a president and the grandson of a senator;
Vice President Al Gore, the son of another senator; and Senator
John McCain, the son and grandson of full admirals. Former
Senator Bill Bradley is from a family with at least three previous
generations of local political leadership. These candidates are not
unique; instead they are current examples of an established pat-
tern of extensive family involvement in American politics docu-
mented most recently in a study of state and national supreme
court justices which included a three generational model of elite
continuity to explain this phenomenon (Kurtz 1997b).
